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ABSTRACT
The popularity of digital currencies, especially cryptocurren-
cies, has been continuously growing since the appearance of
Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer (P2P) cryptocurrency pro-
tocol enabling transactions between individuals without the
need of a trusted authority. Its network is formed from re-
sources contributed by individuals known as miners. Users
of Bitcoin currency create transactions that are stored in
a specialised data structure called a block chain. Bitcoin’s
security lies in a proof-of-work scheme, which requires high
computational resources at the miners. These miners have
to be synchronised with any update in the network, which
produces high data traffic rates. Despite advances in mobile
technology, no cryptocurrencies have been proposed for mo-
bile devices. This is largely due to the lower processing capa-
bilities of mobile devices when compared with conventional
computers and the poorer Internet connectivity to that of
the wired networking. In this work, we propose LocalCoin,
an alternative cryptocurrency that requires minimal compu-
tational resources, produces low data traffic and works with
off-the-shelf mobile devices. LocalCoin replaces the compu-
tational hardness that is at the root of Bitcoin’s security with
the social hardness of ensuring that all witnesses to a trans-
action are colluders. It is based on opportunistic network-
ing rather than relying on infrastructure and incorporates
characteristics of mobile networks such as users’ locations
and their coverage radius in order to employ an alternative
proof-of-work scheme. Localcoin features (i) a lightweight
proof-of-work scheme and (ii) a distributed block chain.
1. LOCALCOIN
Decentralised cryptocurrencies have to deal with three
main challenges: (1) Proof of ownership- users should
be able to prove they have the amount of money they claim
to have. (2) Double spending avoidance - a defense
mechanism against double spending. (Users are not able to
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spend the same money more than once). (3) Incentives
- for its stakeholders. Mobile devices are unable to par-
take as peers in any cryptocurrency, because of their lower
processing capabilities compared to conventional computers
and their unstable connectivity to the Internet compared to
ordinary wire-line access protocols. The problem that we
address in this work is whether we can develop a cryptocur-
rency suitable for mobile ad-hoc networks with high connec-
tivity. We propose LocalCoin, a scheme that replaces the
computational hardness that is at the root of Bitcoin’s secu-
rity with the social hardness of ensuring that all witnesses to
a transaction are colluders (users assisting the malicious user
to double spend). Where computational hardness provides
a weakest-link security guarantee - it suffices to break the
scheme once - the social hardness provides a strongest-link
guarantee: if just one witness to the transaction is not coop-
erating, the scheme cannot be broken. This makes it possi-
ble to apply the same idea in mobile environments without
sufficient computation power or internet connectivity, while
taking advantage of its distributed nature [4].
(1) We are dealing with the proof of ownership issue by
proposing a distributed block chain and demanding users to
at least store the blocks containing their transactions. The
proposed distributed block chain has a redundancy factor
between the users. LocalCoin, similarly to Bitcoin[2], stores
transactions into blocks. All the transactions in the same
block are collectively verified. In order for one block to be
created a minimum number of users to verify each transac-
tion is needed The relationship of these variables with the
total amount of users affects the time needed to verify one
block and prove the ownership of all the users to whom the
transactions belong to.
(2) Regarding double spending attacks, we consider the
location of each user who verifies the creation of a new block.
A block is accepted only when the average euclidean distance
of the nodes agreeing for the block to be accepted exceeds
a certain threshold. This ensures that the information re-
garding each transaction is spread sufficiently in the net-
work. In LocalCoin, cheating is made very difficult because
a malicious user has to misinform the majority of a set of
trusted users. Every user in the LocalCoin protocol selects
the users she trusts. LocalCoin avoids double spending in
two ways. (i) The receiver of one transaction will accept
the transaction if and only if she receives the transaction
signed by at least a minimum number of trusted users of
her trusted network. This constraint imposes a useful de-
lay that spreads the transaction message to more users and
365
increases the probability of some trusted user to detect if
the same input is used in another transaction. Any initiated
transaction is signed by the sender and we assume that it
is impossible for a malicious user to fake a transaction by
pretending to be another user. (ii) During the block cre-
ation process, every participant checks for double spending
attempts. To avoid fake block creation attempts by a set of
collaborative malicious users, LocalCoin enforces that the
average distance between the users that will verify the cre-
ation of a new block exceeds a certain threshold (aVd). This
last constraints tends to scatter the block creation messages
among a very diverse set of users.
(3) We propose an incentive scheme based on transaction
and block fees that are adjusted to the ad-hoc networks.We
extend the transaction fee schema in order to motivate mo-
bile users to participate. We use transaction fees to motivate
users to forward messages and block fees to motivate them
to store as many blocks from the distributed block chain
as possible. Transaction fees are important because mobile
users are competing for them by broadcasting any received
transaction. Block fees are important because users store
the created blocks in order to be able to verify the creation
of new ones. We envision LocalCoin as a location based
cryptocurrency that enables small payments. Apart from
conventional money transactions, LocalCoin can also be ap-
plied to mobile computing/networking applications such as
computation oﬄoading or downloading/streaming services.
2. EVALUATION
We implemented an event-driven simulator in Java in or-
der to evaluate the performance of LocalCoin in practice.
We used three datasets, Infocom’05 and Infocom’06 from
the Haggle project [3] and Humanet [1], which contain user
mobility traces in different environments. The duration of
the simulation is one day. We select the first day of the first
two datasets, while Humanet is one day long. We considered
all the mobile users, which are 41, 78 and 56 respectively.
We introduce the datasets using the concepts of Trans-
action Rate and Transaction Spread. We define trans-
action rate as the fraction of the completed transactions and
the transaction spread as the average fraction of the users
that have stored the transaction. Figures 1a, 1b and 1c
show the average time needed for one transaction to reach
its destination and the transaction rate for different number
of transactions per user. The receiver and the time of the
transaction occurrence are generated uniformly between the
users and the day. Note that all datasets are sparse with
small number of users and hence, the transaction spread is
slow resulting into the small values of transaction rate and
transaction spread. Next, we examine the chances a mali-
cious user (m) has to deliver multiple transactions with the
same input (fake transactions) to more than one users.
m tries to double spend by making at least two of the re-
ceivers of his fake transactions to accept them. However,
double spending will not be successful before the creation of
two blocks that contain these fake transactions, which is not
possible if aVd is large enough. To simulate a double spend-
ing attack, m creates 2, 3, 5 or 10 fake transactions. Figures
1d, 1e and 1f show the average transaction spread of the fake
transactions for variable number of colluders (M). Multiple
copies of the same transaction decrease the average spread
of the fake transaction because the normal users (U \ M)
receive at least two fake transactions with higher probabil-
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Figure 1: Analysis of LocalCoin using users’ mobility traces.
ity. Furthermore, most of these duplicates are stored by the
colluders and not by the normal users.
3. DISCUSSION
Device to device architectures, with the main representa-
tive being 5G, are becoming more and more popular. The
Wifi-direct technology is getting more mature and is adapted
by many customer products, while, the design of LTE-direct
is moving in this route. Motivated by advances in this direc-
tion and considering that any existing infrastructure, like an
institutional network in a university campus, can only im-
prove the coverage of LocalCoin, we argue that protocols
like LocalCoin are applicable and implementable.
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